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The European Community (EC)  is the world leader in oilseed
consumption.  The 1962 Dillon  Round of GATT  provides foreign  oilseeds
free access  to  Community consumers  at world prices.  Oilseeds  as a feed
component  became  very important as the Community livestock  sector
expanded.  High support prices  for livestock  products and grain have
shifted demand  toward oilseeds  and shifted domestic production away
from oilseeds.  These  distortions are of primary concern  to European
Community  policymakers  who  want  to. "rebalance"  market protection and
support away  from grains and toward oilseeds.  The  rebalancing issue  is
central to the negotiations  on agricultural support reduction in the
GATT.  If there is  a rebalancing formula to which  the United States
might agree,  it would  have to  leave U.S.  producers no worse  off.  We
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149used a world trade simulation  model to estimate  the welfare  effects  of
several  rebalancing schemes.  Results show  that rebalancing with
European price supports reduced 20-25 percent  leave U.S.  producers no
worse  off in the short term.
The  1962 Dillon  Round  Concession  committing the EC to duty-free
bindings (no  restrictions) on oilseed  imports was  given by the EC in
exchange  for allowing trade barriers in the newly  formed Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP)  to protect high domestic  price supports on
grains from foreign imports.  CAP border measures  isolated  the high
supports from world markets.
The EC was  a net importer of major farm commodities  in 1962.  Grain
exporting  countries did not foresee  that the high grain price supports and
increased productivity would eventually  give  the EC a major grain surplus
which would,  in the absence  of production controls,  receive  massive
export subsidies.  Duty-free  access of oilseeds  and corn-gluten  feeds
reduced opportunities to feed  excess  EC grains to livestock.  With the
chance  in the  1990's to  renegotiate the Dillon  Round, the EC would
probably  not agree  to exclude  oilseeds  from its CAP nor would  the
United States agree to no  limits on export subsidies  to dispose of EC
grain surpluses.
Rapid expansion of the EC livestock sector has  made oilseed  components
of feeds  very important.  The EC is the world  leader in oilseed
consumption  and oilseed  imports.  The Community would  like to  extract
the internal farm income and price stability benefits  of variable levies  and
reduce internal competition  from cheap protein feeds  in this huge  market,
but has been  unsuccessful  thus far.
Farm income benefits,  stability, and levy  receipts  are not the only  reasons
for desiring change.  The  left panel in figure  1 illustrates the high
supports and isolation achieved  by EC border measures  in most
commodities,  including grains.  High domestic market price support (P,)
in excess  of world market price P,  has decreased  consumption  (qd  to  qd)
and increased  production (q, to  q,).  EC agricultural officials  perceive
that extensive  market support in grains and other crops  has caused
inconsistent  distortions in the grain sector and in the unprotected oilseed
sector.  Increased production in grains has shifted production  away  from
substitutes such  as oilseeds,  reducing  supply s to s'  (right panel of figure
1).  High prices  for grain components  of feed  mixes  have  also  shifted
demand toward nongrain ingredients such  as  oilseeds,  raising oilseed
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demand d to d'.  These distortions have increased oilseed  imports from
qd-q,  to qd-q"  High levels of livestock production support  have increased
demand for both grains and  oilseeds.
In addition, export  subsidies on grains, area  a+b+c in the left panel, have
become very demanding  on the  CAP budget.  Prohibition  of oilseed
import restrictions precludes  tariff receipts to help balance the CAP
budget.
The European Community  would like  to retain grain support  and export
subsidy opportunities while pulling  oilseeds  inside the  CAP barriers, but
other countries  in the  GATT have rejected this option.  The EC solution
has been an oilseed import substitution policy in the form of a processor
subsidy which allowed a premium to be passed on to Community
producers.  This  premium was expanded many times  in the 1980's and
resulted in a doubling  of oilseed production  in the  Community between
1982 and  1987 (Gleckler  and Tweeten,  1990a).
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P, in the left  panel shifted the domestic  supply from  s to ss'.  EC demand
shifted from ED to  ED'  in the center panel and world price fell  from  P,
to Pw  which  hurts producers in the rest of the world, such  as U.S. farmers
(loss  area 1+2+3+4,  right panel).  EC oilseed  consumers,  still able to
purchase at the world price P', benefited  by area c+d+e  and producers
by area a compared with a free market equilibrium at P,.  European
taxpayers must spend  area a+b+c+d  to support the policy.  Instead of
generating  levies  like other EC imports, the oilseed  policy  further strains
the CAP budget.  Even with this producer subsidy, the distortions from
not having oilseeds  inside  CAP barriers are not fully  removed.  Feed
processors  purchasing oilseeds  at world prices  (P,) continue  to find them
a bargain compared with highly  protected grains.
Figure 2
EC oilseed  producer subsidy
EC  import
EC  market  Rest  of  World
Policy  Reform and International Trade 152In December  1987, the American Soybean Association  (ASA) filed a
section 301 unfair trade petition against  the European Community.  The
petition alleged that the EC oilseed  subsidy constituted a thinly disguised
import barrier.  The GATT Dispute Settlement Panel ruled in December
1989 that the European  oilseed subsidies violate  GATT  trading rules and
discriminate against  oilseed  imports.  In view of this most recent
development, the producer subsidy must be eliminated  unless multilateral
negotiations  approve the subsidy as part of a broader agreement that
could reduce EC grain export subsidies.
EC policymakers describe  a move toward equal levels of market  support
across  all related commodities  as "rebalancing."  Community  leaders
would prefer to rebalance oilseeds at high levels without disturbing  grain
and livestock supports.  Such a plan is  unlikely given the opposition of
exporters including the United States.  In recent meetings of the  Uruguay
Round of GATT, EC negotiators  have been pressing  a rebalancing
proposal which would bring oilseeds behind  CAP barriers while
concurrently lowering  all commodity supports  a uniform amount.  If
export subsidies  were cut sufficiently,  EC rebalancing  might be acceptable
to the United States and other exporters.
In the context of negotiations,  an acceptable  solution might be one in
which U.S. producers are at least no worse off after rebalancing.  At issue
is whether such a rebalancing  solution exists.  Given present oilseed
subsidies, that rebalancing  at reduced support levels would probably  not
leave EC producers indifferent without direct income compensation.
Conceptual  Framework
Conceptual models in figures 3  and 4 depict  the effects of incorporating
oilseeds in the CAP system of variable  levies and of lowering market
supports  for grains.  In figure  3, the processor subsidy  (assumed to be
passed to producers  at price P,) is  replaced by uniform market  protection
for grains  and oilseeds.  The EC domestic  support price  P,, assumed  to be
at the same level  as the former domestic processing subsidy, determines
both consumption and production.  Demand shifts from free market  curve
d to dd', and imports  fall from  qd'-q,  to qdq,.  Reduced  imports  lower
world price to P~.  European producers  are not affected  but consumers
lose area a+b+c+d.  The position  of European taxpayers  changes  from
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EC change  from oiseed producer support  to full market
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154paying  the area a+b to collecting  levies  c+e.  The lower  world price
benefits U.S.  oilseed consumers  by area 1+2, but producers  lose area
1+2+3 in the right panel.
Figure 4 depicts  a lower level of intervention  in the EC grain market.
The CAP support price is lowered  from P, to Pi.  European consumers
benefit by area a+b while  producers are worse  off by area a+b+c.
Taxpayers benefit by  area b+c+d+e+f+g+h+i+  j+k.  The increased
receipts evident in figure 3 and the savings  in export restitution from
figure 4 potentially could enable the EC to directly  compensate  producer
losses with a decoupled  payment without further budget  expenditures.
World grain price rises from P, with the current  policy  to P,  from lower
EC grain exports  in figure 4 benefiting  U.S. producers by area  1+2+3.
U.S. consumers are worse off by area  1+2.
The conceptual  framework does not reveal whether the reduced level of
EC oilseed imports and grain exports will balance  losses  to U.S. oilseed
producers  (fig.  3) with gains to U.S. grain producers (fig.  4).  The
simplified partial equilibrium conceptual  model does  not account  for
individual country impacts or interactions among  commodities.  These are
best analyzed with a mathematical  international trade model.  Impacts of
rebalancing  are quantified for the EC and the United  States in the next
section.
Empirical Analysis
We estimated the effects  of including oilseeds  in a rebalanced  CAP  using
a  seven-region world trade model  incorporating the assumptions of
neoclassical  trade theory (see Roningen,  1986;  Sullivan and others,  1989;
and Gleckler and Tweeten,  1990b for descriptions of the model).  Data
for  1989 were  used to  initialize the  model.  Results  reflect  changes  from
1989 conditions and are in 1989  prices.  The behavioral coefficients  apply
to an intermediate-run period of 4 to  5 years, other things equal.  The
model  simultaneously  estimates  changes  in markets for nine commodities:
beef, pork, poultry meat, wheat,  corn, other coarse  grains, oilseeds
(principally  soybeans,  rapeseed, and sunflower  seed),  oilmeal,  and sugar.
Substitutability and complementarily  among commodities  are accounted
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negotiations focus on net change in U.S. producer welfare.
EC rebalancing  was represented  in the empirical analysis  as a uniform
percentage  reduction in price support of grain, oilseeds, and livestock
products with oilseed and oilmeal  markets fully incorporated  inside CAP
barriers.  Actual supported prices  in 1989 ranged  from 115 percent  to  166
percent  of the world market price  (table 1).
The oilseed processor subsidies are assumed to be terminated,  bringing
producer and consumer  prices to the same level realized by producers  in
1989 with the processor  subsidy.  With both the variable  levy oilseed
revenue  and termination of processor  taxes adding to government
revenue,  the CAP fund is  much enhanced.  The percentage  reductions  in
table 2 and subsequent  tables are reductions  of consumer and producer
prices from levels  realized by producers  in 1989.
Price support reductions  of 0 percent  (where oilseed markets were
brought inside the barriers without any reduction) to 30 percent were
simulated with the model.  The 0-percent  simulation estimates  a possible
outcome if the GATT negotiations  break down completely.  The  15-
percent simulation  resembles the EC proposals to the GATT in 1990 for
Table  1--1989 actual EC price support as a percentage of world market
price





Poultry meat  138
Wheat  144
Corn  166
Coarse grains  128
Oilseeds  147
Weighted average  140
Source:  Unpublished data  from U.S. Department  of Agriculture.
Policy  Reform  and International Trade 156Table 2--Producer surplus change at different levels  of EC rebalancing
Uniform  reduction of  Producer surplus change  for all  commodities
price support for  meat,
grains, and oilseeds  United States  EC  Rest of world
Percent  Million  dollars
0  -948  751  -2,539
15  -308  -2,003  -175
20  -84  -2,910  651
25  142  -3,796  1,446
30  368  -4,675  2,281
reducing support.  The 30-percent reduction simulates  the Hellstrom
proposal presented at Brussels in December  before negotiations  were
called  off.
As  estimates of the producer  surplus change  in table 2 indicate, U.S.
producers are hurt substantially by incorporating oilseeds  into the CAP
without accompanying  reductions in support.  However,  as European
support is reduced between  20 and 25 percent,  U.S. producers become
indifferent overall  to the changes.  In other words,  the simulations
indicate that some EC rebalancing scheme  might be acceptable  to the
United States.  The redistribution of benefits among producers would
influence  their receptivity to such  a scheme.  EC producers  benefit  from
the simple  inclusion of oilseed  markets inside the CAP  (0-percent
reduction).  But,  as overall  import barriers are reduced, EC producers
incur substantial losses.  The  pattern of gains  to commodity  producers
outside the United States and the EC parallel  those of U.S.  producers
over the  range of EC support reductions.
Tables  3 through 7 detail the welfare  changes  from various  levels of EC
rebalancing.  Table 3  (0-percent reduction)  indicates that EC livestock
producers are hurt by higher prices  for the oilseed  component  of feed
mixes.  Oilseed  and oilmeal  consumers  lose  because  they must buy at the
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uniform support
Item  Producers  Consumers  Taxpayers  Welfare
Million dollars
European  Community:
Beef  -170  0  38  0
Pork  -266  0  145  0
Poultry  meat  -138  0  80  0
Wheat  0  0  -19  0
Corn  0  0  -10  0
Coarse grains  0  0  -12  0
Qilseeds  0  -3,036  3,097  0
Qilmeal  1,325  -3,140  932.0
Sugar  0  0  0  0
Total  751  -6,176  4,249  -1,176
United States:
Beef  81  4  0  0
Pork  121  -30  0  0
Poultry meat  77  7  0  0
Wheat  -9  6  0  0
Corn  15  28  0  0
Coarse  grains  -3  10  0  0
Oilseeds  -648  465  0  0
Qilmeal  -586  617  0  0
Sugar  4  1  0  0
Total  -948  1,108  0  160
high support price.  Instead of spending  for oilseed producer support, the
CAP budget  collects a levy on oilseed and oimeal imports.  U.S. livestock
producers are slightly better off because  of reduced EC exports,  but
decreased European consumption  and imports  hurt U.S. oilseed
producers.
Table 5 reports effects  of a 20-percent  rebalanced  reduction in EC
support,  the scheme which most  nearly produces  overall  U.S. producer
indifference  to  rebalancing.  The redistribution  in benefits  to  U.S.
Policy Reform and International Trade 158producers  is evident in this table as livestock and grain  farmers gain
substantially from reduced EC supports while U.S. oilseed  and oilmeal
producers  are hurt.
The redistribution  of benefits may not be as serious  as these estimates
indicate because  of the nature of oilseed  production in the United States.
U.S. oilseeds  are often grown by the .same operations that produce
Table  4--Welfare  effects  of EC rebalancing with 15-percent reduction in
uniform support
Item  Producers  Consumers  Taxpayers  Welfare
Million  dollars
European  Community:
Beef  -519  423  63  0
Pork  -845  741  297  0
Poultry meat  -448  36  186  0
Wheat  -754  653  195  0
Corn  -246  299  67  0
Coarse  grains  -176  244  -14  0
Oilseeds  -147  -2,618  2,884  0
Oilmeal  1,125  -2,703  829  0
Sugar  7  0  0  0
Total  -2,003  -2,599  4,502  -100
United States:
Beef  130  -67  0  0
Pork  255  -192  0  0
Poultry meat  218  -140  0  0
Wheat  44  -18  0  0
Corn  133  -69  0  0
Coarse grains  5  1  0  0
Oilseeds  -568  403  0  0
Oilmeal  -527  551  0  0
Sugar  2  1  0  0
Total  -308  470  0  162
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uniform support
Item  Producers  Consumers  Taxpayers  Welfare
Million dollars
European Community:
Beef  -629  558  70  0
Pork  -1,041  993  339  0
Poultry meat  -551  484  215  0
Wheat  -1,031  891  280  0
Corn  -334  408  98  0
Coarse grains  -194  292  -16  0
Oilseeds  -199  -2,469  2,809  0
Oilmeal  1,059  -2,555  784  0
Sugar  10  0  0  0
Total  -2,910  -1,398  4,579  271
United  States:
Beef  144  -91  0  0
Pork  303  -250  0  0
Poultry meat  266  -190  0  0
Wheat  66  -28  0  0
Corn  176  -105  0  0
Coarse grains  4  0  0  0
Oilseeds  -539  383  0  0
Oilmeal  -507  529  0  0
Sugar  1  2  0  0
Total  -84  250  0  160
livestock and grain.  The losers from including oilseeds  in the CAP  are
the main beneficiaries  of European price support  reduction  in grains and
other commodities.
Nearly all categories  of EC producers  are hurt by  rebalancing with the 20-
percent or greater reduction in support.  The net welfare  (deadweight)
gains and cash-flow generated  by reduced export  oilseed processing
subsidies would enable direct compensation of producer  losses with
considerable  savings  left over.  The budget  savings of $4,579 million
shown in table 5 represent  almost 20 percent  of the 1989  CAP budget.
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uniform support
Item  Producers  Consumers  Taxpayers  Welfare
Million dollars
European Community:
Beef  -746  701  77  0
Pork  -1,223  1,247  373  0
Poultry meat  -651  607  239  0
Wheat  -1,222  1,070  329  0
Corn  -432  516  123  0
Coarse grains  -274  387  -19  0
Oilseeds  -254  -2,320  2,733  0
Oilmeal  994  -2,406  745  0
Sugar  12  0  0  0
Total  -3,796  -198  4,600  606
United  States:
Beef  162  -115  0  0
Pork  350  -307  0  0
Poultry meat  315  -241  0  0
Wheat  78  -35  0  0
Corn  223  -142  0  0
Coarse grains  9  -5  0  0
Oilseeds  -510  359  0  0
Oilmeal  -486  508  0  0
Sugar  1  2  0  0
Total  142  24  0  166
Other rebalancing  and support  reduction levels  (tables 4, 6, and 7)
indicate  similar EC effects  and U.S. producer  welfare redistributions.  In
every case,  CAP budget  savings  are more than enough  to compensate  EC
producers  for income loss.  Deadweight  welfare benefits from rebalancing
increase  in the EC and United  States as EC supports are reduced.
Common Agricultural Policy  Rebalancing:
The Basis  for Possible  Agreement
161Table 7--Welfare  impacts  of EC rebalancing with 30-percent reduction in
uniform support
Item  Producers  Consumers  Taxpayers  Welfare
Million dollar
European Community:
Beef  -857  836  84  0
Pork  -1,413  1,489  402  0
Poultry meat  -752  730  448  0
Wheat  -1,497  1,310  416  0
Corn  .- 510  625  162  0
Coarse grains  292  434  -26  0
Qilseeds  -295  -2,190  2,661  0
Qilmeal  926  -2,257  706  0
Sugar  15  0  0  0
Total  -4,675  977  4,853  1,155
United  States:
Beef  178  -139  0  0
Pork  396  -362  0  0
Poultry meat  366  -292  0  0
Wheat  101  -45  0  0
Corn  267  -178  0  0
Coarse grains  8  -5  0  0
Oilseeds  -484  339  0  0
Qilmeal  -464  482  0  0
Sugar  0  2  0  0
Total  368  -198  0  170
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Our estimations indicate that some  level  of European rebalancing leaves
the overall  economic  welfare  of U.S.  producers unchanged.  The
reduction in CAP supports necessary to bring about the net  U.S.
producer indifference  is between  20 and 25 percent.  At that level of
reduction, as apparent in deadweight gains,  producers in the rest of the
world experience net benefits as do U.S.  consumers  and the total
economy.
The redistribution of benefits  from U.S.  oilseed  growers  to U.S. livestock
and grain producers may be even  less  of a problem than the  model
estimates  indicate.  Much  of the redistribution occurs within farming
operations producing grains and livestock  as well  as soybeans.
The 20- to 25-percent  range falls  within levels  of support reduction
discussed  in the final days of the December  1990 GATT negotiations  in
Brussels.  The feasibility  of these rebalancing schemes  does  not consider
the long-term  consequences  to the United States  and other agricultural
exporters of having  oilseeds  permanently behind  CAP barriers.  However,
with rebalancing and a 20-percent reduction in market support, the
European Community's  CAP budget  benefits  by $4,579 million.  This
figure  is enough to directly compensate  the $2,910 million  loss to EC
producers and still  have substantial budget  savings.  If the EC decides  to
rebalance without a  significant reduction in support for other
commodities  (0-percent  reduction), U.S.  oilseed  producers we
sustain substantial losses.
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